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SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT V. REDDING AND 
SCHOOL STRIP SEARCHES: ALMOST, BUT NOT QUITE 
THERE YET 
Timothy J. Petty∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 25, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Safford Uni-
fied School District v. Redding and held that the strip search of thirteen-
year-old Savana Redding was unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
1
  Redding is important because 
it marks the first time that the Supreme Court has addressed strip 
searches in schools; the Court has only considered the Fourth 
Amendment in the school context on two other occasions.
2
  In Red-
ding, school officials suspected Savana Redding of carrying banned 
prescription-strength and over-the-counter pills without permission.
3
 
At the end of a series of searches, female school officials, upon the 
directive of the school principal, ordered Savana to strip down to her 
underwear, “pull her bra to the side and shake it,” and “pull out the 
elastic on her underpants.”
4
  The strip search caused Savana to ex-
pose her breasts and pelvic area.
5
  The Court determined that the 
Fourth Amendment did not permit the strip search of the thirteen-
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 1 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643 (2009). 
 2 The other two U.S. Supreme Court cases that considered the Fourth Amend-
ment in the school setting are New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), and Vernonia 
Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).  Vernonia considered whether random urina-
lysis testing of student athletes violates the Fourth Amendment. 515 U.S. at 648.  
T.L.O., however, deals with the search of a student’s belongings in a school.  469 U.S. 
at 328.  T.L.O. also marked the first time that the Supreme Court considered how the 
Fourth Amendment should apply, if at all, to searches in schools conducted by 
school officials.  Id. at 332. 
 3 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2638. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
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year-old female student under those circumstances because of insuf-
ficient danger or information about the item’s location.
6
 
To someone unfamiliar with the history of Fourth Amendment 
school search jurisprudence, the result that the Court reached in 
Redding may seem like an obvious conclusion.  Moreover, the result 
that the Court reached may seem like the only reasonable conclusion 
under the circumstances.  But lower courts have demonstrated an in-
ability to reach such seemingly sound rulings and have found argua-
bly less reasonable strip searches either constitutional or protected by 
qualified immunity.
7
  In Jenkins v. Talladega City Board of Education, for 
example, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for school 
officials who strip searched two eight-year-old girls in a school bath-
room in an attempt to locate seven dollars that one student had re-
ported missing from her purse.
8
  Cases like Jenkins are the result of 
courts taking a vague standard and applying it in a way that leads to 
unfortunate outcomes.  The case law leading up to Redding contains 
examples of courts construing the standard to justify the result that 
each court wanted to reach. 
Prior to the Court’s recent decision in Redding, the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s only other attempt to express what the Fourth 
Amendment permits in the school search context occurred over two 
decades ago in New Jersey v. T.L.O.
9
  In T.L.O., the Court held that 
Fourth Amendment protection does apply to searches conducted by 
public school officials.
10
  Although the Court provided protection, it 
also imposed a lesser standard and declared that searches conducted 
by school officials must only be reasonable under the circumstances 
rather than be supported by probable cause.
11
 
Despite T.L.O.’s guidance, lower courts that have considered 
school strip searches have managed to misapply the standard, which 
has created more confusion for future courts that consider similar 
cases.  Specifically, courts often apply the T.L.O. test in different ways, 
and some courts stress certain factors more than others.
12
  Further-
more, the Supreme Court has declined to take any certiorari peti-
tions over the last twenty-five years to clarify the standard and how it 
 
 6 Id. at 2643. 
 7 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997).  
 8 Id. at 822–23.  See infra Part II for a discussion of similar cases. 
 9 469 U.S. at 328. 
 10 Id. at 333. 
 11 See id. at 340. 
 12 See infra Part II.C. 
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should be applied, particularly in the strip search context.
13
  This lack 
of clarification by the Court has allowed the confusion and inconsis-
tencies to continue among the lower courts. 
The Court made an attempt to rectify these problems in Redding.  
Although it clarified T.L.O. and added two additional factors to the 
T.L.O. standard,
14
 the Court may not have gone far enough to assure 
that the same problems do not continue.  Fortunately, the Court did 
provide additional guidance on the extent of permissible strip 
searches.  The real effect of the decision, however, depends on 
whether lower courts properly apply Redding when facing strip search 
questions under slightly different factual circumstances.  This Com-
ment will analyze the two additional factors promulgated by the 
Court in Redding to demonstrate that strip searches conducted by 
school officials in the school setting should almost always violate the 
Fourth Amendment.  This Comment will also propose that both fac-
tors should be required to justify an intrusive strip search. 
Another subsidiary problem to the improper application of the 
T.L.O. standard is qualified immunity.  Qualified immunity is a doc-
trine that allows public officials to avoid liability when making deci-
sions in an official capacity if they can show that although they vi-
olated the law, they had insufficient notice because clearly established 
law does not indicate a constitutional violation.
15
  When deciding cas-
es involving searches by school officials, even if courts find that an 
official violated the Fourth Amendment, courts often find that the 
law was unclear and grant qualified immunity to the official.  The 
frequent granting of qualified immunity under the current standard 
compounds the problem by creating a snowball effect where each 
court that grants qualified immunity is failing to clarify the standard 
for school searches in their jurisdiction.
16
  Granting qualified immun-
ity ignores T.L.O. and perpetuates unconstitutional searches by per-
mitting school officials to escape liability. 
In Redding, the Court granted qualified immunity to the school 
officials who conducted the strip search of Savana.
17
  The decision to 
 
 13 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997), 
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 966 (1997). 
 14 See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642–43.  When considering the reasonable-in-scope 
prong of the T.L.O. standard, the Court noted that there was no danger to the stu-
dents due to the small quantity of prescription drugs and that there was no reason to 
suspect that Savana was hiding the pills in her underwear.  Id. 
 15 See id. at 2643. 
 16 See, e.g., Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 17 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2637–38. 
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grant qualified immunity in Redding may be seen as a stamp of ap-
proval to both school officials who act outside of their authority and 
to courts that may be inclined to continue granting immunity to 
school officials.  Most importantly, the imprecise standard articulated 
by the Court and its grant of qualified immunity may lead lower 
courts to continue granting qualified immunity when novel situations 
not previously evaluated under the new Redding test arise. 
Part II of this Comment will discuss the history of case law re-
garding strip searches in the school setting under the Fourth 
Amendment.  The focus of this Part will be the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in T.L.O. and the circuit courts that have since interpreted the 
T.L.O. standard.  This Part will demonstrate that although T.L.O. of-
fered a good standard at the time, it has faced much misapplication 
and dilution by lower courts.  Part II will also discuss how Redding at-
tempted to properly clarify the T.L.O. standard by offering guidance 
for future courts on the constitutionality of strip searches as well as 
the potential implications of that guidance.
18
  Notably, the Court re-
frained from seizing the opportunity to ban strip searches altogether.  
Part III of this Comment will examine the Redding factors and suggest 
that the test should be read by courts as a conjunctive, rather than 
disjunctive, test.  Part IV of this Comment will discuss the Court’s 
grant of qualified immunity, which may create a situation where qual-
ified immunity is improperly granted in the future due to the impre-
cise standard established in Redding.  Part V will conclude with a brief 
discussion of the possible impact going forward. 
II. SCHOOL SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath of affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.
19
 
The Fourth Amendment is the guiding force behind all 
searches, whether in the home, the car, or the school.  The main fo-
cus of the Fourth Amendment is that searches should not be “unrea-
sonable.”  As for the warrant requirement, the U.S. Supreme Court 
 
 18 This Comment will focus more on the “reasonable-in-scope” prong of the 
T.L.O. test because Redding focused more on that prong. 
 19 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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has articulated that searches outside the judicial process without ap-
proval are per se unreasonable unless a warrant exception applies.
20
  
Some exceptions to the warrant requirement include “hot pursuit,” 
consent to a search, search incident to arrest, pat downs, and admin-
istrative searches.
21
  Importantly, one of those exceptions to the rule 
permits warrantless searches when the government has a special need 
that would be frustrated by the traditional warrant requirements.
22
  
T.L.O. serves as an example of a situation where a warrant was not re-
quired due to the special circumstances of the school setting.
23
 
B. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of School Searches 
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided that a reasonableness test 
should apply to searches conducted by school officials.
24
  In T.L.O., a 
teacher discovered two girls smoking in the bathroom, one of whom 
was T.L.O.
25
  T.L.O. denied the allegation that she was smoking.
26
  
The school principal, Choplick, searched T.L.O.’s purse, located a 
pack of cigarettes, and removed the pack from the purse.
27
  After re-
moving the cigarettes, Choplick noticed rolling papers, which he be-
lieved to be related to drug use, and continued to search the purse.
28
  
Choplick then found marijuana, a pipe, empty plastic bags, a large 
amount of one-dollar bills, and an index card containing students’ 
names.
29
 
Although the State of New Jersey only raised the issue of whether 
the exclusionary rule should bar certain evidence, the Court took the 
opportunity to consider the limits that the Fourth Amendment places 
on searches conducted by school officials.
30
  The Court began its dis-
cussion by noting that state and federal courts have struggled to find 
a balance between protecting students’ Fourth Amendment interests 
and providing school officials with the ability to maintain a safe learn-
 
 20 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 21 See David C. Blickenstaff, Strip Searches of Public School Students: Can New Jersey v. 
T.L.O. Solve the Problem?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994). 
 22 See id. 
 23 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).    
 24 Id.   
 25 Id. at 328. 
 26 Id.  
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328. 
 30 Id. at 331–32. 
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ing environment.
31
  The Court then explained that although the 
Fourth Amendment typically applies to police conduct, the Court has 
never limited its application to situations involving the police.
32
  It 
then discussed how some courts have used the theory of in loco paren-
tis, which means acting in the place of the parent,
33
 to determine that 
the Fourth Amendment does not apply to teachers’ and school ad-
ministrators’ conduct because their authority comes from parents, 
not the State.
34
  T.L.O. rejected this approach because education is 
compulsory; thus, the Court explained, schools cannot claim parental 
immunity while carrying out public policy.
35
 
After determining that the Fourth Amendment applies to school 
officials, the Court turned to a discussion of the appropriate Fourth 
Amendment standard for searches in the school setting.
36
  The Court 
noted that the underlying requirement of Fourth Amendment 
searches is that they must be reasonable and that reasonableness de-
pends on the context of the search.
37
  According to the Court, in or-
der to receive Fourth Amendment protection, one must have a legi-
timate privacy expectation that is recognized by society.
38
  The Court 
then acknowledged that schoolchildren have legitimate reasons for 
bringing non-contraband items to school and that there is no reason 
to conclude that they have waived their right to privacy.
39
 
The Court weighed the rights of schoolchildren against the legi-
timate interest that schools have in maintaining discipline and recog-
nized that school officials should be given flexibility with disciplinary 
procedures.
40
  As a result, the Court determined that the warrant re-
quirement is inappropriate for the school setting because it will bur-
 
 31 Id. at 332 n.2. 
 32 Id. at 335; see, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (requiring build-
ing inspectors to comply with the Fourth Amendment). 
 33 In loco parentis literally means “in the place or position of a parent.”  See 7 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 765 (2d ed. 1989). 
 34 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. 
 35 Id. at 336–37. 
 36 Id. at 337. 
 37 Id.  The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.”  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  Therefore, the Fourth Amendment’s standard is 
reasonableness and all searches, at the very least, must be reasonable.  T.L.O., 469 
U.S. at 337.  Of course, higher standards, such as probable cause, are required in cer-
tain situations. 
 38 Id. at 338.  Conversely, the Fourth Amendment does not protect subjective ex-
pectations of privacy that society deems unreasonable.  Id. 
 39 Id. at 339. 
 40 Id. at 339–40. 
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den the need for “swift and informal disciplinary procedures.”
41
  The 
Court recognized that in most situations an official must have proba-
ble cause before a search can be performed.
42
  The Court explained, 
however, that “[t]he fundamental command of the Fourth Amend-
ment is that searches and seizures be reasonable, and although ‘both 
the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear 
on the reasonableness of a search . . . neither is required.’”
43
  The 
Court then agreed with other courts that have determined that 
searches in the school setting should hinge on the search’s reasona-
bleness rather than probable cause because of the strong need to 
maintain order.
44
 
The Court next parsed the reasonableness standard into a two-
part inquiry.
45
  The first inquiry considers whether “the search was 
justified at its inception.”
46
  The Court explained that a search will 
normally be “justified at its inception” if there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that a search will reveal evidence of a violation 
of the law or school rules.
47
  The second inquiry considers whether 
the search conducted “was reasonably related in scope to the cir-
cumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”
48
  Un-
der the second prong, the Court provided that a search will be per-
missible in scope when the measures adopted “are reasonably related 
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of 
the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”
49
 
In T.L.O., the Court ultimately found that the first search for the 
cigarettes was reasonable because Choplick had reasonable suspicion 
that he would find the cigarettes in T.L.O.’s purse, a violation of 
school rules.
50
  Next, the Court found that Choplick’s search for mari-
juana was justified because he had reasonable suspicion once he dis-
 
 41 Id. at 340. 
 42 Id. 
 43 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 
266, 277 (1973)).   
 44 Id. at 341. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 341–42. 
 48 Id. at 341. The Court used language from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), 
in the two-part test it adopted in T.L.O. 
 49 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. 
 50 Id. at 345. 
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covered the rolling papers.
51
  The Court then concluded that the 
search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
52
 
Safford Unified School District v. Redding marked the first time that 
the U.S. Supreme Court applied its T.L.O. framework to a new set of 
facts. 
53
  In Redding, Wilson, the assistant principal, requested that 
thirteen-year-old Savana Redding accompany him to his office.
54
  Wil-
son then showed Savana a planner containing knives, lighters, a per-
manent marker, and a cigarette.
55
  Savana admitted that the planner 
belonged to her but claimed that she had lent it to a friend and that 
none of the items belonged to her.
56
  Wilson proceeded to show Sa-
vana four white prescription-strength ibuprofen and one over-the-
counter naproxen, which were banned under school rules.
57
  Savana 
denied knowledge of the pills and that she had been giving them to 
fellow students.
58
  Savana consented to a search of her belongings, 
and Wilson, along with Romero, an administrative assistant, searched 
Savana’s backpack.
59
 
After failing to locate the pills in the backpack, Wilson instructed 
Romero to take Savana to the nurse’s office to search her clothes.
60
  
Romero and the school nurse, Schwallier, asked Savana to remove 
her jacket, socks, and shoes.
61
  Next, the school officials, both female, 
 
 51 Id. at 347.  Thus, under the two-part test, the search for cigarettes was justified 
at its inception and the search of the purse and the further search for marijuana 
were reasonable in scope.   
 52 Id. at 347–48. 
 53 See 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).  In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of random urinalysis testing of student athletes.  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995).  In Vernonia, the Court held that the urinalysis 
policy conducted by the school did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of 
“the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and 
the severity of the need met by the search.”  Id. at 664–65.  The Court in Vernonia, 
however, did not apply the T.L.O. framework and relied on T.L.O. primarily for 
background information on the scope of privacy in the school setting.  Id. at 652–57.  
Rather than apply the T.L.O. framework, the Court examined the reasonableness of 
the school’s urinalysis policy and concluded that it was reasonable and therefore 
constitutional. Id. at 664–65.  Interestingly, the dissent noted that the evidence that 
the school district used to justify its suspicionless drug-testing program could have 
been used to justify a search of particular students for drugs under T.L.O.  Id. at 679 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).   
 54 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2638. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2638. 
 61 Id. 
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asked Savana to remove her stretch pants and t-shirt, neither of which 
contained pockets.
62
  Lastly, the school officials instructed Savana to 
“pull her bra out to the side and shake it” and “to pull out the elastic 
on her underpants.”
63
  These actions exposed, to some degree, Sava-
na’s breasts and pelvic area.
64
 
Savana’s mother filed suit against the school district, Wilson, 
Romero, and Schwallier claiming that the strip search violated Sava-
na’s Fourth Amendment rights.
65
  The individual defendants moved 
for summary judgment and contended that Savana’s rights were not 
violated and, if they were, that the qualified immunity defense ap-
plied.
66
  The District Court for the District of Arizona granted the 
summary judgment motion after determining that the search did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.
67
  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
68
  The 
circuit, sitting en banc, however, reversed the decision and found 
that the strip search violated the Fourth Amendment under the 
T.L.O. test.
69
  The en banc court determined that the strip search 
failed both prongs of the T.L.O. test.
70
  In addition, the court held 
that T.L.O. clearly established constitutional principles that put 
school officials on notice, and for that reason, it denied qualified 
immunity for Wilson.
71
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
72
  The Redding Court be-
gan its analysis by discussing T.L.O. and noting that unlike the prob-
able cause standard, the lesser standard for school searches only re-
quires school officials to have a “moderate chance of finding 
evidence of wrongdoing.”
73
  The Court turned to a discussion of 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist., 504 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 67 Id. at 829.  
 68 Id. 
 69 Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist., 531 F.3d 1071, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Grant of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 
S. Ct. 987 (2009) (No. 08-479). 
 73 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009).  The Court 
indicated that some factors to consider are the degree to which the facts suggest 
prohibited conduct, the specificity of the information, and the reliability of the 
source.  Id.  The Court, however, noted that none of these factors can control and 
that standards are fluid and depend on the context.  Id.    
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whether the school officials were justified in their search of Savana.
74
  
After examining the facts leading up to the initial search of Savana’s 
backpack, the Court concluded that Wilson’s level of suspicion about 
Savana’s involvement in pill distribution justified a search of Savana’s 
bag and outer clothing.
75
  The Court found that the searches were not 
excessively intrusive given the facts that the school officials uncovered 
and acted on; it stated that “[i]f Wilson’s reasonable suspicion of pill 
distribution were not understood to support searches of outer clothes 
and backpack, it would not justify any search worth making.”
76
 
The Court next focused on the strip search.
77
  First, the Court 
discussed the seriousness of strip searches by acknowledging reac-
tions of students who have been strip searched and noted that per-
sonal privacy expectations suggest that strip searches require a higher 
level of justification.
78
  The Court recognized that strip searches can 
be frightening, embarrassing, and humiliating, particularly for ado-
lescents, and as a result, some jurisdictions have banned them alto-
gether.
79
  While strip searches are highly invasive, the Court made it a 
point to state that they may still be permissible in some circums-
tances; T.L.O. governs the searches’ constitutionality.
80
 
Applying the T.L.O. standard, the Court stated that the “content 
of the suspicion” that Wilson possessed did not justify the level of in-
trusion of the search because of the limited threat that the prescrip-
 
 74 See id. at 2640. 
 75 Id. at 2640–41.  Prior to the search, Jordan Romero, another student, told the 
principal that certain students had been bringing drugs and weapons to school and 
that he had gotten sick after taking one of the pills.  Id. at 2640.  Romero gave a pill 
that he said he had received from another student, Marissa Glines, and told the prin-
cipal that students were planning to take the pills at lunch.  Id.  A search in the prin-
cipal’s office revealed the pills along with a razor blade.  Id.  Marissa told Wilson that 
Savana gave her the pills and that she did not know anything about the day planner.  
Id.  Wilson did not ask any follow-up questions regarding the likelihood of finding 
pills in Savana’s possession.  Id.  The same school officials involved in Savana’s strip 
search performed the same search on Marissa, finding no additional contraband.  Id.  
Wilson also gathered additional information from staff members that implicated Sa-
vana in other rowdy behavior.  Id. at 2641.  At this point the events involving Savana 
took place.  Id. 
 76 See id. at 2641.  In other words, the Court found that the searches, excluding 
the strip search, were reasonable at their inception due to the facts linking Savana to 
the pills and were reasonable in scope because they were not excessively intrusive. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id.  
 79 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641–42.  
 80 Id. at 2642.  The Court’s express decision not to ban strip searches will be dis-
cussed infra, in Part III.A. 
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tion drugs presented to the students.
81
  The Court next stated that 
Wilson did not have a reasonable suspicion that Savana hid the pills 
in her underwear.
82
  The majority noted that cases do exist where in-
dividuals have hidden drugs in their underwear, but it found that a 
mere general level of suspicion is not enough to justify such an intru-
sive search.
83
  Rather, the majority found that for a search as intrusive 
as that performed on Savana to be reasonable, the officials must have 
“a suspicion that the search will pay off.”
84
  The Court then deter-
mined that the combination of the prescription drugs’ lack of danger 
and the officials’ insufficient suspicion that Savana carried the pills in 
her underwear rendered the search unreasonable.
85
  Ultimately, the 
Court concluded that “the T.L.O. concern to limit a school search to 
reasonable scope requires the support of reasonable suspicion of 
danger or of resort to underwear for hiding evidence of wrongdoing 
before a search can reasonably make the quantum leap from outer 
clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts.”
86
 
Turning to the issue of qualified immunity for the individual 
school officials, the Court articulated the applicable standard: an in-
dividual is entitled to qualified immunity if clearly established law 
does not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.
87
  The 
Court next discussed how lower courts, including the Ninth Circuit 
panel decision in the present case, have upheld strip searches under 
the T.L.O. standard.
88
  It concluded that the foregoing court opinions 
differed enough in their application of T.L.O. to require immunity 
 
 81 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642.  The Court indicated that Wilson did not have a 
reason to believe that students were distributing large amounts of drugs.  Id.  Wilson 
also knew that the prescription pills possessed characteristics of common painkillers 
equivalent to two Advil or one Aleve.  Id. 
 82 Id. at 2642. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id.  The Court explained that in this case, the intrusion was not warranted 
based on the facts.  Id.  It  pointed to the non-dangerous contraband, the lack of a 
tradition of hiding pills in intimate places among the students, and the lack of evi-
dence that Savana hid the drugs in her underwear.  Id.  In addition, the Court noted 
that the school officials never determined that Marissa actually received the drugs 
from Savana, and even if she had, the transaction took place days earlier, which 
would reduce the likelihood that Savana still possessed the pills.  Id. 
 85 Id. at 2642–43. 
 86 Id. at 2643. 
 87 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643.  
 88 Id.  The Court mentioned Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991), 
Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 113 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997), and Thomas v. Ro-
berts, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003).  Id. at 2643–44.  See infra Part II.C for a more de-
tailed discussion of these cases. 
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for the school officials.
89
  The Court acknowledged that “disuniform 
views of the law” do not always warrant qualified immunity but stated 
that the cases are numerous enough to create doubt about T.L.O.’s 
clarity.
90
 
Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg, however, dissented on the 
issue of qualified immunity for the school officials.
91
  Justice Stevens 
first discussed how the majority opinion did not alter the T.L.O. 
framework but merely applied it to the present case to find the search 
unconstitutional.
92
  Justice Stevens noted that the conduct in this case 
was “clearly outrageous” because it went far beyond permissible con-
duct under T.L.O.; thus, the conduct obviously constituted an inva-
sion of constitutional rights.
93
  Justice Stevens next discussed how 
qualified immunity should not depend on whether lower courts have 
misread the Court’s precedents.
94
  The Justice noted that the Court 
has relied on the divergence among courts in their decision to grant 
qualified immunity only when qualified immunity would prevent offi-
cials from having to predict future law.
95
 
Justice Ginsburg also claimed that the strip search violated clear-
ly established law under T.L.O. and, therefore, that the Court should 
not have granted qualified immunity.
96
  Justice Ginsburg discussed 
factors that contributed to the search’s unreasonableness and exces-
siveness under T.L.O.
97
  According to Justice Ginsburg, the search 
could not be reconciled with T.L.O., and Wilson could not reasonably 
 
 89 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643–44. 
 90 Id.   
We would not suggest that entitlement to qualified immunity is the 
guaranteed product of disuniform views of the law in the other federal, 
or state, courts, and the fact that a single judge, or even a group of 
judges, disagrees about the contours of a right does not automatically 
render the law unclear if we have been clear.   
Id. 
 91 See id. at 2644–45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 
2645–46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 92 Id. at 2644 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 93 Id. at 2644. 
 94 Id. at 2644–45. 
 95 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2645.  Justice Stevens claimed that because Redding does 
not alter the T.L.O. standard, the Court did not alter the applicable law.  Id. 
 96 Id. at 2645 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 97 See id. at 2645–46. 
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have believed that the law permitted the strip search under the cir-
cumstances at issue.
98
 
Justice Thomas, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
agreed with the majority that granting qualified immunity was prop-
er; but, unlike the other eight members of the Court, Justice Thomas 
claimed that the school officials did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.
99
  The Justice first stated that he supported returning to the 
doctrine of in loco parentis, a much more deferential approach.
100
  Jus-
tice Thomas maintained that the majority used a vague standard that 
permits judges to second guess school officials who are attempting to 
maintain discipline and contended that the search was reasonable 
under T.L.O.
101
  Justice Thomas explained that T.L.O. considered and 
rejected the notion that a search’s legality depends on a court’s eval-
uation of the school rule; T.L.O. held that if the school administra-
tors reasonably suspected a student of violating school rules, the ad-
ministrators could justify a subsequent search.
102
  Consequently, 
Justice Thomas argued that the Court has now placed school officials 
in an impossible position of determining whether a given infraction is 
severe enough to warrant an investigation.
103
  Justice Thomas stated 
that a standard based on the actual threat of a drug is unworkable 
because it will require school officials to stop searches lest a court 
subsequently find the offense not serious enough to warrant the 
search.
104
  Justice Thomas argued that the school should have been 
able to enforce a school rule that amounted to a crime.
105
 
C. Circuit Courts’ Misapplication of the T.L.O. Standard 
This Part examines circuit court opinions that have considered 
strip searches in the school context.  It will serve to demonstrate some 
mistakes that courts have made when applying T.L.O. and the quali-
fied immunity doctrine.  The outcomes of these cases demonstrate 
why Supreme Court intervention was necessary to clarify the constitu-
tionality of strip searches in schools. 
 
 98 Id. at 2646.  Justice Ginsburg quotes T.L.O. and states that the search became 
“‘excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the 
infraction.’”  Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)). 
 99 Id. at 2646 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 100 Id.   
 101 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2646. 
 102 Id. at 2651. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 2651–52. 
 105 Id. at 2653. 
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In 1991, six years after T.L.O., a high school student sued her 
school and various school officials for a strip search that she claimed 
violated her Fourth Amendment rights.
106
  In Williams, a student in-
formed the school principal, Ellington, that another student had of-
fered her white powder.
107
  Eventually, after more reports of students 
using a substance called “rush,”
108
 Ellington and Assistant Principal 
Easley removed Williams and Michelle from class and confronted 
them about the allegations.
109
  Michelle took a brown vial containing 
“rush” out of her purse, but both girls denied ownership of the vial or 
any other drug.
110
  After failed initial searches, two female school offi-
cials asked Williams to remove her clothes down to her undergar-
ments.
111
  This search also failed to produce any drugs.
112
 
The Sixth Circuit noted that T.L.O. alone governed the question 
of whether the search violated constitutional rights.
113
  The court then 
stated that the lack of additional case law has left courts reluctant to 
define the contours of a Fourth Amendment violation.
114
  The court 
concluded that it was not unreasonable for Ellington to believe that 
the search did not violate the student’s rights.
115
  The majority found 
Ellington’s decision to search to be reasonable based on the informa-
tion that he possessed at the time.
116
  The majority also found the 
search to be reasonable in scope due to the small size of the object.
117
  
In other words, Williams could have hid the object in her undergar-
ments given the object’s size; thus, Ellington’s belief that she may 
have hidden the drugs in her undergarments was reasonable.  The 
Sixth Circuit concluded by granting qualified immunity to the school 
 
 106 See Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 107 Id. at 882. 
 108 “Rush,” according to the court, “is a volatile substance that can be purchased 
over the counter, and while possession of ‘rush’ is legal, inhalation of it is illegal un-
der Kentucky law.”  Id. at 882. 
 109 Id. at 882–83. 
 110 Id. at 883. 
 111 Id.  There was a factual dispute over whether Easley pulled on the elastic of 
Williams’ underwear to see if anything fell out, but the court indicated that it was not 
material for summary judgment.  Id.  
 112 Williams, 936 F.2d at 883. 
 113 Id. at 886. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 887. 
 117 Id. 
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officials based on clearly established rights at the time of the inci-
dent.
118
 
In 1993, the Seventh Circuit found a strip search of a student 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
119
  In Cornfield, school 
officials forced a student to change in the locker room so the officials 
could visually inspect his body to assure that he was not carrying 
drugs.
120
  The school officials believed that the student was “crotch-
ing” drugs.
121
 
The court began its analysis by noting that the same reasonable 
suspicion required for a search of a locker, bag, or pocket may not be 
reasonable in the strip search context.
122
  Next, the Seventh Circuit 
considered the T.L.O. proclamation that age matters for reasonable-
ness.
123
  The court explained that children of different ages have dif-
ferent levels of potential criminality and determined that adolescents 
could be capable of both criminality and understanding whether they 
should consent to a search.
124
  The court then stated that it will be 
more cautious when determining the reasonableness of a search of 
elementary school children because those children are not aware of 
the impact of a strip search or whether it is appropriate to consent to 
a strip search.
125
  Finally, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the 
search was reasonable, and although children at sixteen are self-
conscious about their adolescent bodies, the school officials carried 
out the search in the least intrusive manner possible.
126
 
In 1997, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the grant of qualified im-
munity for school officials who strip searched elementary school stu-
dents suspected of stealing money from a classmate.
127
  The incident 
began when a second-grade classmate informed the teacher, Fannin, 
that seven dollars were missing from her purse.
128
  Several students 
implicated Jenkins, McKenzie, and Jamerson in the alleged theft, and 
 
 118 Williams, 936 F.2d at 887. 
 119 See Cornfield v. Consol. High School Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1323 (7th 
Cir. 1993). 
 120 Id. at 1319. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 1321. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321. 
 126 Id. at 1323. 
 127 Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Ed., 115 F.3d 821, 822 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 128 Id. 
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Fannin questioned the students; each accused the other.
129
  Fannin 
asked the students to remove their shoes and socks, and when this ef-
fort to locate the money failed, she directed Jenkins and McKenzie to 
the girls’ bathroom.
130
  Another teacher, Herring, ordered the two 
girls to enter the bathroom stalls and come back out with their un-
derpants to their ankles.
131
  The teachers failed to locate the missing 
money and proceeded to bring the three students to the principal’s 
office.
132
  Jamerson informed the principal that the money was hidden 
behind a file cabinet, but a search in that location did not reveal the 
money.
133
  Jenkins and McKenzie claimed that Herring escorted them 
to the bathroom for a second time where they were asked to remove 
their clothes again.
134
 
The Eleventh Circuit focused its opinion on whether the district 
court should have granted qualified immunity to the individuals for 
the Fourth Amendment claims.
135
  The Eleventh Circuit began its 
analysis by noting that T.L.O. is the only authority on school searches, 
and thus, is the only authority that could have clearly established the 
law.
136
  The court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ claim that the school 
officials must have known that the search exceeded the reasonable-
ness standard established in T.L.O.
137
  The court indicated that T.L.O. 
did not apply to the present facts with obvious clarity and that 
“[t]here is no illustration, indication, or hint as to how the enume-
rated factors might come into play when other concrete circums-
tances are faced by school personnel.”
138
  The court opined that 
 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 822–23. 
 133 Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 823. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 824 n.1. 
 137 Id. at 824. 
 138 Id. at 825.  Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit stated the following in relation 
to the ambiguity of the current standard: 
In the absence of detailed guidance, no reasonable school official 
could glean from these broadly-worded phrases whether the search of a 
younger or older student might be deemed more or less intrusive; 
whether the search of a boy or girl is more or less reasonable[;] and at 
what age or grade level; and what constitutes an infraction great 
enough to warrant a constitutionally reasonable search or, conversely, 
minor enough such that a search of property or person would be cha-
racterized as unreasonable. 
Id. at 825–26. 
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courts should not require school officials to interpret “general legal 
formulations that have not been applied to specific . . . facts.”
139
  Con-
sequently, the Eleventh Circuit granted qualified immunity finding 
that the law did not put the school officials on notice that their con-
duct was impermissible.
140
 
In 2003, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a grant of qualified im-
munity to a school teacher and an officer who conducted a strip 
search of thirteen elementary school students in an attempt to locate 
twenty-six dollars.
141
  After noticing that the money disappeared from 
her desk, the teacher, Morgan, obtained permission from the vice 
principal to conduct the strip searches.
142
  Officer Billingslea took the 
boys into the bathroom in groups of five and asked them to drop 
their pants; some dropped their pants and underwear.
143
  Billingslea 
then proceeded to check their underwear for the money.
144
  Similarly, 
Morgan asked the female students to lift their shirts and their bras to 
show that they did not possess the money.
145
 
The Eleventh Circuit noted that T.L.O. did not state whether a 
search required an individualized suspicion and instead adopted a 
reasonableness test.
146
  Citing Jenkins, the court concluded that T.L.O. 
did not attempt to establish the contours of the Fourth Amendment 
in different school settings.
147
  The court then posited that the T.L.O. 
standard did not put defendants on notice that a strip search in this 
case would be unconstitutional.
148
  It suggested that when the stan-
dard is significantly general in nature, existing case law that applies 
the general standard to more specific facts will usually be necessary to 
give fair and clear notice.
149
  Although the court ended up granting 
 
 139 Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 827. 
 140 Id. at 828.  The dissent believed that T.L.O. sufficiently warns that a strip search 
in these circumstances violates the Fourth Amendment.  Id. (Kravitch, J., dissenting).  
The dissent noted that the Supreme Court has never required factual identity for 
qualified immunity.  Id. at 829.  The dissent argued that certain searches violate the 
Constitution as a matter of common sense.  Id. at 834.  The dissenting judge also 
opined that the nature of the infraction did not warrant a strip search and that strip 
searches should only be permissible in extraordinary circumstances.  Id. 
 141 Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 951–52 (11th Cir. 2003).   
 142 See id. at 952. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 953. 
 147 Roberts, 323 F.3d at 954. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
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qualified immunity, it did note that an action in certain narrow cir-
cumstances may be so egregious that an official is not entitled to 
qualified immunity even without well-established case law.
150
 
In 2005, the Sixth Circuit found a strip search of twenty students 
for missing money to be unconstitutional but granted qualified im-
munity to the school officials.
151
  In Beard, teachers searched students 
in the locker room for prom money that a student reported miss-
ing.
152
  The search of the male students in the locker room by two 
male teachers, Munz and Carpenter, consisted of the students “lower-
ing their pants and underwear and removing their shirts.”
153
  The 
search of the female students conducted by two female teachers, Bal-
sillie and Langen, consisted of the females pulling up their shirts and 
pulling down their pants, but not their underwear, while standing in 
a circle.
154
 
Evaluating the strip searches of the male and female students 
under T.L.O. and Vernonia, the court found that the searches violated 
the Fourth Amendment.
155
  In finding the constitutional violation, the 
court noted the highly intrusive nature of the searches, the fact that 
the searches were conducted to locate money, the lack of individua-
lized suspicion, and the lack of consent.
156
  The Sixth Circuit, howev-
er, found that the law at the time did not “clearly establish that the 
searches were unreasonable under the particular circumstances 
present in this case.”
157
  Further, the court opined that T.L.O. and 
Vernonia set forth basic principles for school searches, “yet do not of-
fer the guidance necessary to conclude that the school officials were, 
or should have been, on notice that the searches performed in this 
case were unreasonable.”
158
 
 
 150 Id. at 955 (“If the plaintiff . . . can show that ‘the official’s conduct lies so ob-
viously at the very core of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits that the unlawful-
ness of the conduct was readily apparent to the official, notwithstanding the lack of 
caselaw,’ then the official is not entitled to qualified immunity.” (quoting Smith v. 
Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir. 1997))). 
 151 Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id.  A police officer arrived halfway through the search of the male students 
and told the teachers to continue searching the students because teachers “had a lot 
more leeway” than the police.  Id. 
 154 Id. at 602. 
 155 Id. at 605–06. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Beard, 402 F.3d at 606. 
 158 Id.  In explaining T.L.O., the Sixth Circuit noted that “the Court did little to 
explain how the factors should be applied in the wide variety of factual circumstances 
facing school officials today.”  Id. 
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In Phaneuf v. Fraikin, the Second Circuit found a strip search of a 
female high school student to be unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.
159
  In Phaneuf, a student told Birdsall, a teacher, that 
another student planned to bring marijuana on a school trip.
160
  The 
student, Phaneuf, denied the allegation but both teachers present, 
Birdsall and Cipriano, believed Phaneuf was lying.
161
  Cipriano asked 
the school’s substitute nurse, Fraikin, to conduct the strip search.
162
  
Fraikin stated that she did not want to conduct the search herself, 
and school officials asked Phaneuf’s mother to conduct the search or 
the police would be called.
163
  Cipriano searched Phaneuf’s purse and 
found cigarettes and a lighter while waiting for her mother to ar-
rive.
164
  The mother strip searched Phaneuf in the presence of Frai-
kin.
165
 
The court determined that the search was not justified at its in-
ception under T.L.O.
166
  It found that the four factors raised by the 
school officials—the tip from another student, Phaneuf’s disciplinary 
problems, Phaneuf’s suspicious denial, and “discovery of cigarettes in 
her purse”—did not create the reasonable suspicion necessary to jus-
tify the search.
167
  Specifically, the court determined that the student’s 
tip justified additional investigation by school officials but did not jus-
tify a strip search.
168
  The court concluded by noting that the district 
court never reached the qualified immunity issue and that it should 
resolve the issue on remand.
169
 
D. Harms Associated with Strip Searches of Students 
Many legislatures, courts, and researchers have taken note of the 
emotional harm that can result from a strip search.  Both states and 
school boards have recognized the traumatic effects of strip searches 
in the school context and have prohibited or severely restricted 
 
 159 448 F.3d 591, 592 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 160 Id. at 593. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 593–94. 
 164 Id. at 594. 
 165 Phaneuf, 448 F.3d at 594. 
 166 Id. at 600. 
 167 Id. at 597. 
 168 Id. at 598–99. 
 169 Id. at 600. 
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them.
170
  For example, Wisconsin goes as far as to criminalize strip 
searches conducted by school officials.
171
 
Courts have already recognized the intrusive and traumatic na-
ture of strip searches.
172
  The court in Justice v. City of Peachtree stated 
that strip searches are “demeaning, embarrassing, repulsive, signify-
ing degradation and submission.”
173
  The Seventh Circuit in Doe v. 
Renfrow stated: “It does not require a constitutional scholar to con-
clude that a nude search of a thirteen-year old is an invasion of con-
stitutional rights of some magnitude.  More than that: it is a violation 
of any known principle of human decency.”
174
  In Cornfield, the court 
stated that “no one would seriously dispute that a nude search of a 
child is traumatic.”
175
  The court recognized that adolescents will suf-
fer greater trauma from a strip search because they are becoming 
more self-conscious about their bodies.
176
 
A search of a child or adolescent has a greater impact than a 
similar search of an adult because privacy is more important for a 
child’s maturation than it is for an already mature adult.
177
  A child 
may even experience a strip search in a manner akin to sexual 
abuse.
178
  Even though school officials may be viewing or touching 
during the search rather than sexually assaulting, the level of trauma 
to the child may be the same.
179
  Some post-search symptoms of vic-
tims include “sleep disturbance, recurrent and intrusive recollections 
of the event, inability to concentrate, anxiety, depression and devel-
opment of phobic reactions,” and strip searches may even lead to at-
tempted suicide.
180
  Also, the traumatic impact on any given child va-
 
 170 See Brief for Nat’l Ass’n of Social Workers and its Arizona Chapter et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. 
Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479), 2009 WL 870022 at *14 [hereinafter Nat’l Ass’n of So-
cial Workers Amici Curiae Brief].   
 171 See id.   
 172 See id. at *16. 
 173 961 F.2d 188, 198 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 174 631 F.2d 91, 92–93 (7th Cir. 1980). 
 175 Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
 176 Id. at 1321 n.1. 
 177 Steven F. Shatz et al., The Strip Search of Children and the Fourth Amendment, 26 
U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 11 (1991). 
 178 Id. at 12. 
 179 See id. at 13. 
 180 Id. at 12. 
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ries, and school officials do not know what the impact will be when 
commencing a search.
181
 
In addition to the statements about the effect of strip searches 
generally, Savana Redding’s experience illustrates a specific reaction 
to a strip search.  Savana stated: “I was embarrassed and scared, but 
felt I would be in more trouble if I did not do what they asked.  I held 
my head down so that they could not see that I was about to cry.”
182
  
In addition, Savana stated: 
The strip search was the most humiliating experience I have ever 
had.  Mrs. Romero and Mrs. Schwallier did not look away while I 
was taking off my clothes.  They did nothing to respect my priva-
cy . . . [and] I felt offended by the accusations made against me 
and violated by the strip search.
183
 
Savana did not return to the middle school after the strip search be-
cause she did not want to be near the school officials who searched 
her.
184
  Savana attended an alternative high school but dropped out.
185
 
III. POTENTIAL ISSUES THAT REDDING FAILED TO ADDRESS AND WHAT 
IT MEANS GOING FORWARD 
A. Implications of Redding 
Despite the obvious outrageousness of many school strip 
searches, courts are reluctant to find constitutional violations.  Lower 
courts often looked for reasons to justify the search rather than apply 
the T.L.O. test in a method consistent with the language of T.L.O. 
and common sense.  The Redding Court possessed a unique opportu-
nity to guide lower courts by clearly realigning constitutional juri-
sprudence in school search cases with common sense.  This Part ex-
amines Redding’s contribution and recommends how courts should 
apply the Redding factors. 
The Supreme Court in Redding, as suggested by Justice Stevens,186 
merely applied the T.L.O. standard in a way that it deemed proper in 
relation to the facts in the case and did not substantively alter the test.  
 
 181 Id. at 13. 
 182 See Nat’l Ass’n of Social Workers Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 170, at *13. 
 183 Id. 
 184 See David G. Savage, Supreme Court to Weigh Strip-Searches at Schools, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 19, 2009, at 3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/19/nation/na-
stripsearch19. 
 185 Id. 
 186 In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that “[n]othing the Court decides today 
alters this basic framework . . . [and] it simply applies T.L.O. . . . .”  Safford Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2644 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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The Court did attempt to clarify T.L.O. by indicating two factors that 
should be considered when determining whether a search is reason-
able in scope under the second prong of the inquiry.
187
  Because Red-
ding does not create a new test for school strip searches, it is possible 
that the same types of problems and outcomes that existed before the 
Supreme Court intervened will continue.  Although the Court re-
frained from banning strip searches entirely, the two factors of the 
reasonable-in-scope inquiry suggest that strip searches will pass con-
stitutional muster less than before Redding.
188
 
The first factor that the Court articulated under the reasonable-
in-scope prong is the threat presented by the item sought (“threat 
factor”).
189
  When applying this factor to the second T.L.O. prong, the 
Court determined that the drugs in question presented a limited 
threat even though they could potentially pose more danger if stu-
dents digested them in large enough quantities.
190
  Thus, both the 
type and quantity of contraband can contribute to establishing a suf-
ficient threat factor. 
The second factor under the reasonable-in-scope prong is that 
there must be some indication that discovering the evidence sought 
requires an intrusive strip search (“location factor”).
191
  Moreover, the 
mere fact that cases exist where students have hidden contraband in 
their underwear does not make the search reasonable.
192
  General 
background possibilities that contraband is hidden in locations that 
require strip searches are not enough; a reasonable search requires 
suspicion that it will pay off.
193
  In addition, the Court pointed to the 
fact that the strip search of the other student did not yield the pills, 
and the allegations against Savana occurred days before Wilson or-
dered the search.
194
  The Court indicated that perhaps witnesses stat-
ing that Redding was hiding the pills in her underwear would have 
contributed to the search’s reasonableness.
195
  Even though the Court 
indicated general considerations for determining whether contra-
 
 187 See id. at 2639 (majority opinion). 
 188 “Its indignity does not outlaw the search . . . .”  Id. at 2636. 
 189 Id. at 2642. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642. 
 193 Id.   
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
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band is hidden in undergarments, it did not establish definitive crite-
ria for when location suspicion warrants a strip search.
196
 
The Court’s analysis of both factors does not provide much 
guidance on how the factors should apply to situations outside of the 
facts in Redding.  First, the threat factor fails to explicitly guide school 
officials as to what type and amount of drugs will warrant a strip 
search.  Presumably, at the very least, this additional factor means 
that strip searches for money or other non-dangerous items will fail.
197
  
Under the threat factor, money does not pose a physical danger to 
the student in possession or to the general student population.  Addi-
tionally, a certain quantity of money does not render it more danger-
ous, as with prescription pills, for example.  Next, although weapons 
pose the greatest threat of immediate harm to students, a strip search 
will not be necessary due to their size.
198
  The inquiry becomes less 
clear when school administrators search for drugs; the question of 
determining what is serious enough to warrant a strip search still lin-
gers.
199
 
 
 196 The factors that the Court lists are summarized as: 1) general practices of hid-
ing drugs in undergarments at the school; 2) other students’ indications that the 
drugs were hidden there; 3) a prior strip search yielded drugs; and 4) a short time 
frame between the allegation and the search.  Id. at 2642. 
 197 If strip searches for money and other non-dangerous items are not permitted 
under Redding, two of the circuit court cases will no longer be good law on the per-
missible scope of a search.  See Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(granting qualified immunity to officials who conducted a strip search of students in 
an attempt to locate twenty-six dollars); Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 
F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997) (granting qualified immunity for a strip search of two fe-
male second graders to locate seven dollars). 
 198 None of the cases cited in Part II of this Comment deal with weapons.  See supra 
Part II.  Searches for drugs are much more commonplace than searches for weapons 
as indicated by the widespread problem with drugs in schools.  A search of outer 
clothing and bags or backpacks will most likely reveal a weapon, which is much larger 
in size than a handful of pills.  After a school official searches outer clothing and 
pockets, the only place left for a gun or knife would arguably be the waistband of 
pants, and this item could be retrieved without conducting a strip search.  In these 
types of cases, where the suspicion that a student possesses a weapon is high enough 
to potentially justify a strip search, the police probably have been involved.  See gener-
ally Scott A. Gartner, Note, Strip Searches of Students: What Johnny Really Learned at 
School and How Local School Boards Can Help Solve the Problem, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 921, 
924 (1997) (recommending that if a school official believes that a search will reveal 
evidence of a serious crime, the student’s parents and law enforcement should be 
notified).   
 199 Justice Thomas’s dissent addresses this concern.  Cf. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. 
v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2651 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The majority has 
placed school officials in this ‘impossible spot’ by questioning whether possession of 
Ibuprofen and Naxproxen causes a severe enough threat to warrant investigation.  
Had the suspected infraction involved a street drug, the majority implies that it 
would have approved the scope of the search.”).  Justice Thomas contended that the 
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Unfortunately, Redding did not indicate, beyond certain amounts 
of particular prescription pills, which drugs at what quantity consti-
tute a sufficient threat.  Therefore, the majority’s determination that 
the pills in Redding did not present a sufficient threat to warrant the 
strip search will only be useful to school officials in similar factual cir-
cumstances involving similar prescription pills.  It is unclear, for ex-
ample, whether a small amount of marijuana constitutes a sufficient 
threat.
200
  Certainly, any drug, including prescription pills, can be 
dangerous.
201
  Whether a common drug for students to possess, such 
as Ritalin,
202
 could warrant a strip search if a student possesses it with-
out permission is ambiguous under Redding.  Ritalin works well and 
does not produce negative effects on most children.
203
  Some con-
tend, however, that Ritalin “leads to future drug abuse, dulls a child’s 
personality, and gives children ‘highs.’”
204
  Students buying Ritalin on 
the black market and snorting it is another major concern, which can 
lead to harmful results, such as toxic psychosis.
205
  Under the threat 
factor, courts will need to develop a system to weigh the potential 
harmfulness of a substance to determine if a strip search is warranted. 
Despite Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion that courts should 
not distinguish between types of drugs, not all strip searches for drugs 
should be found reasonable under the threat factor.  According to 
the majority’s evaluation, drugs will not always present a serious 
 
majority neglected to honor the T.L.O. proposition that judges should not determine 
the legality of the search based on their view of the importance of the school rule.  
Id. at 2651.  Justice Thomas stated that the school officials could have reasonably 
concluded that the backpack search did not yield the pills because Savana hid them 
in a place where no one would look.  Id. at 2650.  In essence, Justice Thomas argued 
in his dissent that judges should not determine the reasonableness of a search based 
on the importance of the school rule.   
 200 The confusion over which drugs would be serious enough to satisfy the re-
quirement was apparent from oral arguments.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, 
Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).  Some justices asked how the standard would apply 
with certain contraband, such as a black marker pencil, methamphetamine, heroine, 
and cocaine.  Id. at 14.  The Court’s opinion did not address these concerns. 
 201 Justice Thomas also noted that possession of prescription strength Ibuprofen 
without a prescription is a crime in Arizona.  Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2652–53 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting).  In addition, Justice Thomas noted studies indicating the prevalence 
of prescription drug abuse among adolescents.  Id. at 2653. 
 202 Praveen Madhiraju, R.I.P. Ritalin in Proportion! The Eighth Circuit’s Restriction on 
a Parent’s Right to Have Schools Accommodate the Needs of Their Disabled Children: Debord 
and Davis, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1661, 1164–66 (2001) (explaining that three to five per-
cent of children have ADHD and that Ritalin is the most commonly prescribed drug 
for ADHD). 
 203 Id. at 1166. 
 204 Id. at 1167. 
 205 Id. 
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enough threat to warrant a strip search.
206
  Prescription pills in gener-
al, including Ritalin, should not warrant strip searches even though 
the Court put less emphasis on the harm of the drugs to the individ-
ual and more on the likelihood that students were distributing them 
in large quantities.
207
  While the Court indicated that the amount of 
the drug can sometimes make a strip search reasonable, strip search-
ing is too intrusive a method for attempting to locate prescription 
pills that many students are permitted to possess.  Without a legiti-
mate and immediate threat to school safety, courts should not allow 
strip searches under the threat factor of the reasonable-in-scope 
prong.
208
 
The location factor of the reasonable-in-scope inquiry rightly 
suggests that a school official conducting a strip search should at the 
very least have some evidence that a student has hidden the contra-
band in his or her underwear.  This factor clarifies part of the uncer-
tainty the T.L.O. standard created and would have caused some of the 
more obvious cases already decided to come out differently.
209
  On 
the other hand, a case with facts similar to Cornfield would seem to 
pass this second factor.
210
  In Cornfield, the school officials had reason 
to suspect that the student hid drugs in his crotch area.
211
  The poten-
 
 206 See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642. 
 207 Id.  This notion is consistent with Cornfield, where the court admitted the li-
mited threat posed by the suspicion that the student possessed marijuana.  Cornfield 
v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir. 1993).  Although 
marijuana is illegal and banned in all schools, the Seventh Circuit noted that it 
created a limited threat to school safety and required a higher level of reasonable-
ness for an intrusive search.  Id.  Therefore, under the Redding Court’s articulation of 
the reasonable-in-scope prong, possession of small amounts of street drugs that do 
not threaten school safety would fail due to lack of a sufficient threat for a strip 
search. 
 208 Even if a strip search for drugs may be warranted because of the significant 
threat posed by the contraband, the next factor, evaluating the suspicion that drugs 
are hidden in undergarments, will make it almost impossible for a strip search to be 
found reasonable. 
 209 See Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 955–56 (11th Cir. 2003) (granting quali-
fied immunity for school officials who conducted a strip search for twenty-six dollars 
without any reason to suspect the money would be located in the students’ under-
garments); Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(granting qualified immunity based on a strip search for seven dollars where there 
was no indication that the students were hiding the money in their undergarments); 
Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 1991) (granting qualified immunity 
to school officials where no evidence suggested that the “rush” being searched for 
would be located in the undergarments).  
 210 See generally Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316 (7th 
Cir. 1993).   
 211 Id. at 1319. 
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tial problem down the road is that the location factor alone will not 
be enough to deter lower courts that had failed to fault school offi-
cials when they did not possess enough information to reasonably 
search a student’s undergarments.
212
 
Fortunately, strip searches for money are seemingly no longer 
proper under the threat factor of the reasonable-in-scope prong.  
Again, it is unlikely that a strip search would be necessary to locate a 
weapon due to its size.  Therefore, similar to the threat factor, the lo-
cation factor will become relevant almost exclusively when a student 
is allegedly carrying drugs. 
To permit any one of the vague indications that drugs are hid-
den in the undergarments to justify a strip search is unreasonable.  
For example, a general practice among students of hiding pills in 
their underwear at the school should not suffice to warrant a strip 
search.
213
  Next, it would be dangerous to allow school officials to base 
a strip search of a student on an incriminating statement by another 
student without making sure the statement has some level of credibil-
ity.
214
  Courts should require school officials to follow up on tips as 
much as reasonably possible to assure that they are reliable enough to 
warrant an intrusive strip search.
215
  Specifically, the credibility of the 
tip should be examined before strip searching.  Finally, as happened 
in Redding, school officials sometimes obtain information about con-
 
 212 At oral argument, the Court raised concerns over when a search of the under-
garments is reasonable, and the Court did not respond to these concerns in the ma-
jority opinion.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, Safford United Sch. Dist. v. Red-
ding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).  For example, Justice Alito raised concerns over the 
reliability of student accusations.  Id.  
 213 Cf. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003).  Although not directly 
on point, the Eleventh Circuit in Thomas found a strip search without particularized 
suspicion to be unconstitutional.  Id. at 956.  The school officials in Redding sus-
pected Savana of possessing the pills, which would satisfy the requirement of particu-
larized suspicion set out in Thomas.  See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641.  It seems unlikely 
that, just because some students have hidden drugs in their undergarments, strip 
searches will be more constitutional where school officials have no other reason to 
suspect that the drugs were hidden in the undergarments. 
 214 Courts have recognized reliability concerns with informants’ tips.  See Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972)  (“Informant’s tips . . . may vary greatly in their 
value and reliability.”).  Reasonable suspicion depends on the content of information 
and its reliability.  Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).  When evaluating the 
totality of the circumstances to determine if reasonable suspicion is present, courts 
should take into account the quantity and quality of the information.  Id.  Corrobora-
tion of details by independent police work is important to the totality of the circums-
tances inquiry.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241 (1983). 
 215 The Second Circuit in Phaneuf evaluated the informant’s tip and determined 
that it was not reliable enough to warrant a strip search without additional investiga-
tion by school officials.  Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 598–99 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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traband one day, and the strip search is performed on another day.
216
  
This situation raises concerns about the certainty that the contraband 
is located where a strip search would be necessary to uncover it.  All 
of these factors represent obstacles school officials should overcome 
before they possess reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amend-
ment that a student is carrying drugs in his undergarments.
217
  Gener-
ic evidence suggesting drugs are located in a student’s undergar-
ments should not be enough for a strip search. 
The Court articulated a disjunctive approach where only one of 
the two factors of the reasonable-in-scope prong must be satisfied for 
the search to be reasonable in scope.
218
  First, the Court indicated that 
“what was missing from the suspected facts that point to Savana was 
any indication of danger to the students from the power of the drugs 
or their quantity, and any reasons to suppose that Savana was carrying 
pills in her underwear.  We think that the combination of these defi-
ciencies was fatal . . . .”
219
  Two paragraphs later the Court explained 
that “reasonable scope requires the support of reasonable suspicion 
of danger or of resort to underwear for hiding evidence of wrong-
doing before a search can reasonably make the quantum leap from 
outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts.”
220
 
B. A Proposed Solution Under Redding for Strip Searches in the 
School Setting 
It is unclear exactly how courts will apply the factors.
221
  It is poss-
ible that lower courts will follow the disjunctive wording in Redding, 
defer to school officials, and only require that they meet one factor to 
 
 216 See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2640. 
 217 The Court in Redding did not indicate whether a visual detection of unusual 
volume in the undergarment areas contributes to this factor.  Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 
2642.  This should not count towards the reasonableness of the search because it is a 
highly subjective inquiry of whether an area looks too large based on the opinion of 
a school official.  See generally Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 
1316, 1319 (7th Cir. 1993) (involving facts where a school official noticed an “un-
usual bulge,” but the strip search did not yield the drugs).   
 218 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2637 (2009) (“Because there were no reasons to suspect 
the drugs presented a danger or were concealed in her underwear, we hold that the 
search did violate the Constitution . . . .”). 
 219 Id. at 2642–43. 
 220 Id. at 2643 (emphasis added). 
 221 One district court has restated the test as requiring one factor or the other.  See 
Foster v. Raspberry, No. 4:08-CV-123(CDL), 2009 WL 2355854, at *5 n.5 (D. Ga. July 
29, 2009) (stating that even with individualized suspicion “the scope of the search 
was not reasonable under the circumstances because there was no indication of dan-
ger to the students or any reason to suppose that King was carrying the iPod in her 
underwear” (emphasis added)).  
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justify the strip search.  This Comment proposes that lower courts 
should require both factors to be present—threat and suspicion—in 
order for the search to be reasonable in scope.
222
  Thus, the test 
should be conjunctive rather than disjunctive.  Further, the conjunc-
tive view recommended should require a threshold amount of both 
factors to be met rather than a balancing test.  School officials should 
require reasonable suspicion of each factor rather than just one fac-
tor. 
A balancing test, although better than a purely disjunctive ap-
proach, still presents the opportunity for an unwarranted strip search 
to be found constitutional.  For example, under a balancing ap-
proach, a strip search for the same prescription pills involved in Red-
ding would be found reasonable if the principal possessed more reli-
able information that the pills were located in Savana’s 
undergarments.  A reliable location factor should not diminish the 
need for a strong threat factor as well.  Additionally, a situation like 
the one in Cornfield could arguably meet the location factor as long as 
the court determined that a school official had a reasonable suspi-
cion that a student was hiding contraband in his or her undergar-
ments.  This would impose an even lesser standard than in Cornfield 
because in that case, that court at least acknowledged that an intru-
sive search should target contraband that poses a threat to school 
safety.
223
  Rather than have the effect the Court likely intended, Red-
ding applied as a balancing test could serve to justify broader and 
more intrusive searches than some courts have already permitted. 
The conjunctive approach provides the most protection to stu-
dents as well as guidance to school officials and reviewing courts.  If 
lower courts do not interpret Redding to require school officials to 
meet both additional factors, the opinion could lose much of its bite.  
For example, requiring only the location factor suggests that if school 
officials reasonably believed that a student carried in his underwear a 
permanent marker that was banned under school rules, officials 
 
 222 Cornfield supports this contention.  See Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321.  In Cornfield, 
the Seventh Circuit articulated that “a highly intrusive search in response to a minor 
infraction would similarly not comport with the sliding scale advocated by the Su-
preme Court in T.L.O.”  Id.  Despite this declaration, the Court later gets around this 
statement by finding that the strip search “was the least intrusive way to confirm or 
deny their suspicions [and] was not unreasonable.”  Id. at 1323.  Nonetheless, the 
Seventh Circuit seems to be suggesting that a threat is required for an intrusive 
search.  The only difference in approach is that this Comment would contend that 
the search in Cornfield, as with any strip search, is a highly intrusive search that war-
rants additional constitutional protection.  For a brief discussion of the impact of 
strip searches, see supra Part II.E. 
 223 Id. at 1321. 
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could conduct a strip search.  Alternatively, using just the threat fac-
tor, school officials could strip search a student they reasonably be-
lieved brought dangerous drugs to school even if they were almost 
certain that the drugs were in the student’s locker and did not locate 
them there during their initial search. 
From a policy standpoint, requiring both factors assures that 
strip searches will be deemed reasonable only in the most extreme 
and rare circumstances.  For example, if a school official receives a 
reliable tip that a student possesses heroin and is hiding it in his un-
dergarments, a strip search would be proper.  Other students will be 
protected against strip searches when the stricter test is not met.  
From a practical standpoint, requiring both factors will make reason-
ableness determinations easier and more accurate.  For example, if 
courts find that one Redding factor is not met, the search would be 
unreasonable and the inquiry would end.  Also, if courts mistakenly 
determine that either the threat or location factor is met, there is still 
another factor to be met before the search is found to be reasonable.  
When applying factor tests to factual situations that have yet to be 
tested in court, requiring two factors instead of just one will add an 
extra layer of protection before wrongly finding an intrusive search to 
be reasonable. 
Even if strip searches are constitutional in only the rarest cases, 
the standard that the Court provided could lead to more problems if 
not properly applied by lower courts.
224
  Therefore, the best solution 
is to insist that lower courts properly apply both Redding factors while 
using common sense about whether a search is reasonable.  Because 
the Court continues its use of a flexible standard for school searches, 
common sense and attention to the intrusiveness of strip searches is 
even more necessary.  If courts do not agree on what is reasonable 
under T.L.O., school officials will continue having difficulty recogniz-
ing the standard’s limits. 
 
 224 See Robert Barnes, Student Strip Search Illegal, WASH. POST, June 26, 2009, at A1.  
For example, general counsel for the National School Boards Association stated that 
“the decision did not provide clear guidelines about how specific the accusation must 
be, or how dangerous the alleged drugs, before school officials employ such an in-
trusive search.”  Id.  Also, many of the circuit court cases examined in the back-
ground section stated expressly that qualified immunity was granted because T.L.O. 
was not clear enough and that school officials should not be required to balance fac-
tors.  See Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 954 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that the 
T.L.O. test did not put school officials on notice that a strip search would be uncons-
titutional); Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 11 F.3d 821, 825–27 (11th Cir. 
1997) (stating that school officials should not be required to interpret general legal 
formulations). 
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Despite the potential for ambiguous future application of its 
tests, Redding is in line with the Fourth Amendment and T.L.O. in its 
attempt to assure that searches in school remain reasonable, both at 
their inception and in scope.  Although the opinion did not set out a 
crystal clear standard to guide school officials who may still be con-
fused about the permissibility of strip searches, lower courts should 
enforce the test strictly by requiring both factors.  As indicated in the 
analysis above, enforcing the Redding factors strictly will mean that 
strip searches will be less likely to be reasonable in scope than under 
courts’ previous interpretations of T.L.O.  Although the T.L.O. 
prongs and the Redding factors can be met, a proper application of 
the test will result in strip searches only under the right circums-
tances—extreme situations where a strip search may be necessary for 
school safety. 
C. Other Proposed Solutions for Strip Searches in the School Setting 
Other authors, however, have taken different approaches to the 
problem.  One author suggests a creative standard for strip 
searches.
225
  The proposed standard would require the school official 
to have probable cause before conducting a strip search.
226
  Next, 
strip searches would only be permitted to search for evidence of se-
rious violations, which would mainly include situations involving 
weapons and drugs.
227
  Finally, the new standard would require that 
the disruption resulting from the contraband be one that would re-
sult in an immediate disruption of school order.
228
  This approach is 
in line with Redding by emphasizing that strip searches are particularly 
intrusive and deserve stricter review.  One potential issue, however, is 
that school officials may not understand the probable cause standard. 
Another author advocates a ban on strip searches in schools al-
together.
229
  The author suggests that law enforcement officials should 
make the determination as to whether a higher standard of probable 
cause exists to perform the search.
230
  If a situation is sufficiently dan-
gerous that it would warrant a strip search under the Redding threat 
 
 225 See Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 49. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. at 50. 
 228 Id. 
 229 See Gartner, supra note 198, at 924.  The author recommends that if a school 
official believes that a search will reveal evidence of a serious crime, school officials 
should notify the student’s parents and law enforcement.  Id. 
 230 See id. (stating that law enforcement would have to determine whether proba-
ble cause exists and then obtain a warrant). 
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factor, perhaps it makes sense to involve the police anyway.  On the 
other hand, involving the police will likely refocus the situation away 
from school safety and towards punishing the perpetrator if contra-
band is found.  This approach may also seem too burdensome to 
those who are concerned about school officials’ ability to control dis-
cipline in the school.  An additional concern is that T.L.O. did not 
envision the increased use of police in schools and therefore is in-
adequate to deal with commingling of schools and the police.
231
 
The Fourth Amendment requires searches to be “reasonable.”
232
  
Accordingly, because strip searches by school officials are unlikely to 
be reasonable in the school setting,
233
 a ban on strip searches is an 
appealing solution to the problem.
234
  In fact, several states and school 
districts have already banned strip searches in their schools.
235
  De-
spite this apparent trend towards banning strip searches, the judi-
ciary’s role is to interpret the Fourth Amendment.  In doing so, the 
judiciary should conclude that strip searches in the school setting are 
unconstitutional a large percentage of the time—when they fail the 
 
 231 Josh Kagan, Reappraising T.L.O.’s “Special Needs” Doctrine in an Era of School-Law 
Enforcement Entanglement, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 294, 325 (2004) (“Refusing to evaluate 
T.L.O. . . . would allow school systems and law enforcement agencies to continue 
sending children a poor message: We will subject you to a police state at school be-
cause you are children without rights, then we will subject you to severely-punitive, 
adult-like consequences for any infraction.”). 
 232 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 233 See Barnes, supra note 224.  Savana’s ACLU attorney stated that the Court 
made clear that strip searches should only be used in “extraordinary circumstances.”  
Id. 
 234 One author noted that it is unlikely that the Court will ever ban strip searches 
or impose a stricter standard for evaluating them.  See Patsy Thimmig, Note, Not Your 
Average School Day—Reading, Writing and Strip Searching: The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision 
in Jenkins v. Talladega City Board of Education, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1389, 1416 
(1998).  The author stated that the Court should at least require strip searches to be 
reasonable.  Id.  The Court in Redding arguably imposed a stricter standard, although 
technically it is just a clarification of T.L.O.  This Comment suggests that a stricter 
application of the standard will assure that permissible strip searches are reasonable. 
 235 Both states and school boards have recognized the traumatic effects of strip 
searches in the school context and have prohibited or restricted their use.  See Nat’l 
Ass’n of Social Workers Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 170, at *14.  Seven states have 
banned strip searches.  Id.  These seven states are California, Iowa, New Jersey, Okla-
homa, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin.  Id.; see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49050 
(West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 808A.2(4) (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-6.1 
(West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-102 (West 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-
1140 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.600.230(3) (West 2010); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 948.50(3) (West 2009).  Furthermore, many school districts, including New 
York City, have banned strip searches. Nat’l Ass’n of Social Workers Amici Curiae 
Brief, supra note 170, at *14.  For a discussion of the power of local school boards to 
adopt policies that ban strip searches, see generally Gartner, supra note 198.   
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meet the T.L.O. prongs and the Redding factors.  The Supreme Court 
chose not to ban strip searches, so courts will have to stringently apply 
the Redding test in the meantime. 
IV. THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
A. A Brief Description of the Qualified Immunity Doctrine 
The qualified immunity doctrine is not constitutional nor is it 
statutorily created; rather, the Supreme Court created the doctrine 
based upon the belief that governmental interests in the execution of 
its policies may, in some circumstances, outweigh an individual’s in-
terest in challenging unconstitutional government conduct.
236
 
The Court first mentioned qualified immunity in 1967 in Pierson 
v. Ray.
237
  In Pierson, the Court held “that the defense of good faith 
and probable cause . . . is available to [the police officers] in the ac-
tion under § 1983.”
238
  The Court’s first major consideration of quali-
fied immunity occurred in Scheuer v. Rhodes.
239
  In Scheuer, the Court 
determined that the governor of Ohio did not have a right to abso-
lute immunity from suit but that qualified immunity may be available 
to officers of the executive branch.
240
  In Wood v. Strickland, the Court 
found that a school official is not immune from suit if he knew or a 
reasonable person would have known that his official action would 
violate the Constitution or if he acted with malicious intention to in-
terfere with another’s constitutional rights.
241
  Next, in Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, the Court held that “government officials performing discre-
tionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damag-
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.”
242
  Harlow simplified the test by eliminating the subjec-
tive component and only examining the objective component.
243
 
Finally, in Anderson v. Creighton, the Court elaborated on the 
qualified immunity doctrine once more and explained that the right 
violated “must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particula-
rized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right 
 
 236 See Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 21. 
 237 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
 238 Id. at 557. 
 239 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
 240 Id. at 235, 247. 
 241 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). 
 242 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 243 Thimmig, supra note 234, at 1395. 
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must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand 
that what he is doing violates that right.”
244
  Further, the Court articu-
lated that “[t]his is not to say that an official action is protected by 
qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously 
been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law 
the unlawfulness must be apparent.”
245
  In Anderson, the Court de-
fined “clearly established” as whether a reasonable official would be-
lieve the conduct to be unlawful rather than whether the action was 
unlawful.
246
  This clarification expanded the ability of public officials 
to seek protection under the qualified immunity doctrine.
247
 
An officer is “entitled to qualified immunity where clearly estab-
lished law does not show that the search violated the Fourth Amend-
ment.”
248
  Furthermore, the Court has held that “officials can still be 
on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel 
factual circumstances.”
249
  Fundamentally similar facts are not neces-
sary for finding a law to be clearly established.
250
 
One author discussed some of the practical implications of the 
qualified immunity doctrine.
251
  The author raised the difficulty of 
understanding the difference between Fourth Amendment reasona-
bleness and qualified immunity.
252
  For example, “a police officer can 
reasonably (within the meaning of qualified immunity) violate oth-
erwise clearly established Fourth Amendment dictates.”
253
  The author 
suggested the potential problems of this type of logic applied to other 
areas of law through the following hypothetical: “I may have been 
negligent, but I was reasonable in believing that I wasn’t.”
254
 
 
 244 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
 245 Id. (citation omitted). 
 246 See id.; Thimmig, supra note 234, at 1395. 
 247 See id. 
 248 Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 822 (2009). 
 249 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). 
 250 Id. 
 251 See Mark R. Brown, The Fall and Rise of Qualified Immunity: From Hope to Harris, 
9 NEV. L.J. 185 (2008). 
 252 Id. at 193–94. 
 253 Id. at 193. 
 254 Id. at 194.  For an interesting discussion on the qualified immunity doctrine, 
see Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 21–24.  The author noted how Anderson gives offi-
cials two bites at the apple because officials escape liability even if their conduct is 
found to be unreasonable as long as the reasonable official would have believed it to 
be lawful.  Id. at 23.  The official can claim that even though he acted unreasonably 
under the Fourth Amendment, the conduct was still reasonable because it was not 
clearly prohibited.  Id. at 23–24.  The wisdom of the qualified immunity doctrine is 
beyond the scope of this Comment, but it is important to recognize the potential 
PETTY_FORMATTED_FINAL_1.25.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2011  8:42 AM 
460 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:427 
The author, however, noted that the qualified immunity doc-
trine may be justified as not only a substantive defense but as a pro-
cedural rights defense as well.
255
  Thus, qualified immunity can be 
viewed as protecting officials from both financial burdens and the 
burdens of a lawsuit.
256
  The qualified immunity issue “creates a ‘su-
per-summary judgment’ right on behalf of government officials.”
257
  
The advantage for school officials is that even when summary judg-
ment may not be proper, summary judgment may be granted if the 
court finds that the law was not reasonably clear.
258
 
B. Redding’s Grant of Qualified Immunity 
As discussed in Part II.B, the Court in Redding granted qualified 
immunity to the school officials who conducted the strip search of 
Savana.
259
  The majority acknowledged divergent conclusions on how 
the T.L.O. standard applies to strip searches and found that the dif-
ferences of opinion were enough to warrant qualified immunity.
260
  
Interestingly, the majority noted that its grant of qualified immunity 
does not mean that disuniform application of the law will always war-
rant a grant of qualified immunity but that it is warranted in this case 
because the Court may not have been sufficiently clear in T.L.O.
261
 
C. Implications of Granting Qualified Immunity in Redding 
The dissenting Justices correctly noted that Redding does not al-
ter the basic T.L.O. framework other than clarifying the reasonable-
in-scope prong as it relates to strip searches.
262
  Although it is debata-
ble whether qualified immunity technically should have been granted 
in Redding,
263
 the majority recognized the confusion that existed 
 
sweeping power that the doctrine has to allow officials to escape liability.  In factual 
circumstances where the conduct is clearly out of line, protection under the doctrine 
should not be granted. 
 255 See Brown, supra note 251, at 194. 
 256 Id. at 195. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644. 
 260 Id. at 2643–44. 
 261 Id. at 2644. 
 262 See id. at 2644–46 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Jus-
tice Stevens also stressed that “the clarity of a well-established right should not de-
pend on whether jurists have misread our precedents.”  Id. at 2645.  Consequently, 
both the majority and dissent seemed to agree that qualified immunity usually is not 
appropriate simply because lower courts got it wrong. 
 263 One author, discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Jenkins, contended 
that the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari and reversed the grant of 
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amongst lower courts and decided to grant qualified immunity.  Per-
haps it is sensible for the Court to grant qualified immunity to the 
school officials in Redding who conducted a strip search that was less 
severe than other searches where courts have granted qualified im-
munity.
264
 
Post-Redding, it is difficult to predict how the Court’s grant of 
qualified immunity will impact the Fourth Amendment school-search 
frontier.  The concern for future qualified immunity issues in the 
school search context is twofold.  First, courts may view the Court’s 
grant of qualified immunity in Redding as a stamp of approval towards 
granting qualified immunity in questionable situations.  Second, be-
cause Redding uses a factor-based test that leaves the constitutionality 
of strip searches in other contexts up in the air, courts may continue 
to grant qualified immunity to school officials in novel situations that 
are sure to arise.  Consequently, Redding’s imprecision may perpe-
tuate the improper granting of qualified immunity in novel factual 
circumstances. 
It is possible that because the Court failed to both articulate a 
more comprehensive test for strip searches and deny qualified im-
munity, nothing will change.  If Redding had articulated a clearer test, 
the future of the qualified immunity doctrine in the school search 
context would not be as uncertain.  Conversely, if the Court denied 
qualified immunity to the school officials, the Court would have at 
least sent a more serious message that lower courts should not grant 
qualified immunity as leniently as had been done in the past.  In-
stead, the Court’s approach runs the risk of perpetuating the same 
problems that existed pre-Redding. 
It is more likely, however, that courts will follow Redding’s lead 
and find unreasonable strip searches unconstitutional.  Thus, lower 
courts should stringently apply the threat and location factors under 
the reasonable-in-scope prong of T.L.O. to prevent constitutional vi-
olations against school children.  If this occurs, qualified immunity 
will no longer provide school officials with an escape from liability.  
 
qualified immunity in order to deter school officials from conducting unreasonable 
strip searches of school officials.  Thimmig, supra note 234.  Another author stated in 
reference to the decision in Thomas that “[c]ourts cannot continue to promote this 
ignorance by granting qualified immunity to school officials and school districts.”  
Dana Ingrassia, Note, Thomas Ex. Rel. Thomas v. Roberts: Another Photo Finish Where 
School Officials Win the Race for Qualified Immunity, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 621, 651 
(2004). 
 264 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 828 (1997) 
(granting qualified immunity for a strip search of two female second graders for sev-
en dollars that was missing). 
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Because Redding directly considered a strip search under the T.L.O. 
test, courts must recognize, as the Supreme Court did, the intrusive-
ness of strip searches and the emotional harm that can result.  The 
only missing piece to the solution is for courts to properly apply the 
tests to limit strip searches to the extreme situations where they are 
warranted. 
Although the Court chose not to expressly ban strip searches, 
the opinion in Redding recognizes the seriousness of strip searches in 
both the emotional and the constitutional context.  It is unlikely that 
the Supreme Court will revisit the issue anytime soon; lower courts 
will need to take responsibility for protecting student’s constitutional 
rights.  Once the ball starts moving in the right direction, the mo-
mentum should set the judicial system on the right course going for-
ward. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although the Court expressed distaste for the strip search of Sa-
vana and further analyzed the second prong of T.L.O., the law could 
remain almost exactly where it was over twenty years ago if the right 
steps are not taken.  Many circuit courts squandered the opportunity 
to properly apply T.L.O. and deny qualified immunity to school offi-
cials conducting unreasonable strip searches of students.  Lower 
courts now must change course and properly apply the Fourth 
Amendment to school strip search cases. 
Redding clarified T.L.O. by adding two factors to the second 
prong, requiring that the item in question present a threat and that 
the school officials have a reasonable belief that the item is located in 
the student’s undergarments.
265
  Thus, Redding’s additional factors 
and the application of these factors to the reasonableness require-
ment indicate that strip searches should rarely be found reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.  The Court’s approach allows some 
flexibility for school officials to determine when the proper criteria 
for strip searches exist, but courts need to prevent the test from be-
coming one where the lack of express factors results in finding no 
constitutional violations.  Because the Supreme Court is unlikely to 
address the issue again, it will be up to the lower courts or legislatures 
to properly address these issues. 
Naturally, there is concern that the Court was insufficiently clear 
in articulating how searches not entirely similar to the factual situa-
tion of Redding should be handled.  Because Redding created a flexi-
 
 265 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642–43 (2009). 
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ble factor test, uncertainty about how the factors will be applied re-
mains.  This Comment proposes that lower courts need to take the 
initiative to prevent unreasonable strip searches by carefully examin-
ing the threat and location factors established in Redding.  Further, 
courts should examine both factors in conjunction rather than allow-
ing one factor alone to satisfy the reasonableness requirement.  
Courts should insist that school officials possess a reasonable suspi-
cion that each factor is satisfied independently rather than permitting 
a strong showing of one factor to compensate for a weak or nonexis-
tent showing of the other.  For example, an item presenting a signifi-
cant threat should not justify a strip search if very little or no evidence 
suggests the item is located in a student’s undergarments.  States and 
school districts are free to ban strip searches, but until that decision is 
made, the judiciary needs to safeguard students’ constitutional rights. 
Finally, the Court’s grant of qualified immunity poses some po-
tential problems when combined with the flexible factor test it pro-
vides.  A grant of qualified immunity sends the wrong message to the 
courts that have been improperly analyzing qualified immunity ques-
tions.
266
  Also, the ambiguous factors announced in Redding open the 
door for the same problem where courts automatically grant quali-
fied immunity in factual situations that have not been directly ad-
dressed by the Court.  Using a stricter conjunctive approach to the 
factors will remedy this issue as well. 
When the Court granted certiorari in Redding, it had a unique 
opportunity to rectify the problems that have been occurring in the 
school strip search context.  The Court went far enough in explain-
ing factors that should limit strip searches to rare situations.  Redding 
indicated that strip searches are unlawful in at least one factual situa-
tion, ensuring that the scope prong of T.L.O. actually has some bite.  
Importantly, the Court gave the judiciary the tools to properly handle 
these situations.  The factors in Redding should be used to bolster 
T.L.O.’s reasonableness test and to prevent courts and school officials 
from claiming that the guidelines for school strip searches are un-
clear.  Lower courts must stop history from repeating by assuring that 
Redding does not fall by the wayside like T.L.O. did over the past twen-
ty-five years. 
 
 
 266 See supra Part II.C. 
